T.O. 103: Fifty Years Ago – Chile, September 11, 1973: The Coup d’Etat by Pinochet

[The following article is reprinted from Issue No. 30 of The Internationale, the theoretical magazine of the Organizing Committee for the Reconstitution of the Fourth International.]

On September 11, 1973, a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet allowed the army to take power. La Moneda presidential palace was bombed. President Salvador Allende, head of the Popular Unity government, was killed in the attack. In the days that followed, tens of thousands of workers and young people were executed. The working-class neighborhoods were bombed. The torture took on appalling dimensions. Artists’ hands were cut off. And it went on. The labor movement was decapitated. Thousands were forced into exile.

Yet three years earlier, on September 4, 1970, a President had been elected under a left-wing coalition: Popular Unity. And yet, a week before the coup, 800,000 workers demonstrated in the streets of the capital (on the third anniversary of Allende’s election).

They demanded arms from the Popular Unity government to fight the fascists. Seven days later, the working class was delivered unarmed, without instructions, without leadership to the bloodiest of repressions.

How was such a reversal possible? What allowed this coup d’état to take place?
At the beginning of September 1973, when the grim news from Chile had not yet become known, our political correspondent warned:

In Chile, the vast majority of the working-class and small farmers have risen up to end exploitation and oppression. In the name of the Popular Front, they are being prevented from carrying out this great task. The leaders of Popular Unity are directly preparing the counter-offensive of imperialism. The armed gangs that are operating openly, the reactionary officer corps, the local bourgeoisie; they are all preparing in the shadow of the Popular Unity regime to throw back the Chilean proletariat. When the time comes, they will sweep Allende away. Popular Unity, based on the wish to maintain respect for the bourgeois state and private ownership of the means of production, is paving the way to counter-revolution” (editorial in French weekly newspaper Informations Ouvrières [Labor News], whose political continuity is assured by La Tribune des Travailleurs [Workers’ Tribune]).

A few days later, this prediction unfortunately turned out to be correct. It is important to understand why.

In order to do this, it is necessary to look back. From the 19th century onwards, Chile’s economic development was subordinated to foreign capital, particularly British and then U.S. capital. This was linked to the maintenance and consolidation of the large estate landholdings. In 1965, 700 families still dominated the country. Just 5.4 percent of landowners accounted for almost 87 percent of the land, while 120,000 peasant families owned on average less than 2 hectares of land (i.e., a total of 0.7 percent of the usable land area).

The country was rich in copper and iron ores, coal and nonferrous metals. Chile was thus assigned a role in the world capitalist economy as a producer of raw materials of agricultural and mining origin. The commercial bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy served as relays for world imperialism. This comprador bourgeoisie, bought by imperialism and whose resources derived from its subjugation to the world market, did not develop production.

One figure illustrates this. U.S. capitalists invested US$3 million in the copper industry. They made a profit of US$4.5 billion and returned just US$2.3 billion to the comprador state. The parasitic bourgeoisie, which lived off the subsidies of imperialism that exploited the wealth of its country, would only develop production in relation to imperialism’s needs.

In return, the Chilean working class had a long tradition of organization and struggle. The Federation of Chilean Workers (FOCH) was formed at the start of the 20th century. In 1912, the Chilean Socialist Workers’ Party (POS) was founded, which took a position of class independence, calling for a break with the bourgeoisie, much more quickly than many other organizations in Latin America

Its leader, Luis Emilio Recabarren, founded the labor movement on a concept of both a united front and independence. In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, the POS joined the Communist International (CI) in its entirety. There was no split.

In 1932, soviets were constituted, the basis of a short-lived Socialist Republic. All these traditions of class independence created difficulties for the international apparatus of Stalinism in normalizing the Chilean labor movement. Especially since the Chilean CP had joined the Communist International very early on, it had time to be in contact with Trotsky and the leaders of the Russian Revolution.

In 1932, half of the party and its cadres were expelled. In 1936, the Stalinists launched a campaign against the Recabarren legacy. From 1938 to 1947, various popular front governmental combinations led to a defeat in October 1947, after a 40-day general strike.

The working class found the means to reconstitute its trade union confederation, the Workers’ United Centre (CUT), in 1953. The Trotskyists held important positions in it, which they lost in connection with the crisis of the Fourth International.

The Chilean working class has a long tradition of organization and struggle

It was therefore a structured labor movement, including the right of forming internal tendencies – despite Stalinism – and a tradition of class struggle, which prepared the election of Allende.

From 1968 onwards, land occupation was a permanent process, with peasant organizations calling for general strikes. In April 1968, strike action paralyzed the ports, then the post offices. In May, there was a 58-day teachers’ strike.

On May Day 1969, the CUT carried out a real show of force in the demonstrations. The miners were on strike. And a few weeks before Allende’s election, the CUT called a general strike.

To measure the depth of radicalization, one document explains:

Revolutionary violence is inevitable and legitimate. It results from the repressive and armed character of a class government. It is the only path that leads to the seizure of political and economic power, to its defense and its later consolidation. It is only by destroying the bureaucratic apparatus of the bourgeois state’s military that the socialist revolution can be consolidated. Peaceful or legal forms of struggle do not in themselves lead to power. We affirm the class independence of the workers’ front, considering that the national bourgeoisie is the ally of imperialism and, in fact, its tool and that, therefore, it ends up being irreversibly counter-revolutionary.

This passage was not written by the Chilean section of the Fourth International. It is from the main document of the Socialist Party’s Congress in November 1967.

In 1970, a quarter of the population of Santiago was unemployed. From the point of view of the needs of the masses, this situation called for the radical expropriation of large landholdings, as well as the expropriation and nationalization of foreign companies and banks. To do so, it required liberation from imperialist control.

These measures necessitated breaking the resistance of the bourgeoisie.

Faced with this popular upsurge, which threatened the government of the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, the Chilean Communist Party (CP) adopted a position in favor of a popular government that included all the political forces, “the Socialist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the majority of the Radical Party, and a good part of the Christian Democratic Party”.

The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was in power at that time and the Stalinist apparatus sought an alliance with a fraction of the bourgeoisie. A “left” split in the PDC made it possible to form the Popular Unity Action Movement (MAPU).

Contacts were also sought with the Radical Party, which was linked to the interests of sectors of the national bourgeoisie. Another bourgeois organization called “Independent Popular Action” was even created. All this was done to give substance to an alliance of workers’ parties and bourgeois parties, to embody the link with the bourgeoisie.

On October 1, 1969, it was possible for five candidates to represent the “left”, including three bourgeois candidates. Maneuvers took place for months to prevent the emergence of a joint CP-SP workers’ candidate for a break with the bourgeoisie. But there was a huge increase in petitions and demonstrations by grassroots activists demanding a candidate from the workers’ parties.

The CP’s leadership was obliged to make a turn. An agreement was reached on Allende.

In December 1969, an agreement on the election campaign was signed. It referred to the setting up of Popular Unity Committees. The masses who had already started to move were aware of this. Some 14,000 people’s committees were set up in neighborhoods, factories, shanty towns, landed estates, universities, apartment buildings. These people’s committees carried out more and more strikes and land occupations. On July 8, 1970, the CUT called a 24-hour general strike. In Santiago, 700,000 workers stopped work

The working class mobilized – including physically – against the bourgeoisie’s candidate, Alessandri, when he intended to visit working-class towns. In Lota, for example, a 24-hour strike was called before his visit. The municipalities declared that bourgeois figures were not welcome.

These incidents were repeated from town to town.

The copper workers forbade entry to the mining towns. In short, the mobilization against the bourgeoisie continued right up to election day. Seven days before, all of the country’s coalmines were paralyzed by an all-out strike.

A rupture occurred between the working class and the leading circles of the workers’ parties, who refused to confront the forces of reaction

Following the victory of Allende, who came out on top but did not have an absolute majority, Chile’s political Constitution allowed for all kinds of maneuvers. Since there was no absolute majority, it was up to the National Congress (comprised of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) to determine which of the two candidates with the most votes would be President of the Republic.

The PDC had a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The bourgeoisie hesitated: Should it go for direct confrontation and appoint Alessandri, even though he had been rejected in the country and the working class had mobilized? The second alternative was to put the safeguarding of the bourgeois order in the hands of the apparatuses of the workers’ organizations, including by letting them assume power for a time. This was the choice that was quickly made.


But the bourgeoisie demanded guarantees. The National Democratic Party published a text demanding of Allende:

We want a state governed by the rule of law, and this requires the existence of a political system in which authority is exercised exclusively by the competent bodies, executive, legislative and judicial, without the intervention of ‘de facto’ bodies acting in the name of a so-called popular power. We want the Armed Forces and the Carabineros [uniformed national police] to continue to be a guarantee of our democratic system.”

Allende and Popular Unity agreed to these demands. On October 2, a document titled the “Statute of Guarantees”, which included the bourgeoisie’s demands, was drawn up together with representatives of the bourgeoisie. Chilean CP General Secretary Luis Corbalán stated: “Legality ties the hands of the bourgeoisie.” But this legality was that of the Chilean Constitution of 1922, which legitimized the institutions – army, police, courts, government, Chamber of Deputies and Senate – to ensure domination by the system of private ownership of the means of production.

But that’s not all. After Allende’s election, the CP and SP agreed to another document, the so-called “Constitutional Guarantee”, which amended the Constitution. In addition to guaranteeing private education and its funding by the state, and the non-removability of the civil servants of the former administration, it gave a special role and status to the army, which was declared the “guarantor of the Constitution.

The army was guaranteed the absolute right to self-recruitment, without external intervention, i.e., “without any primacy of the civilian over the military.” The army was also guaranteed the monopoly of the right to be armed. This, against the workers’ militias. The CP General Secretary declared at the time:

The army is not a body that is alien to the nation, it is a question of winning it over to the cause of progress. The formation of armed popular militias would be a sign of defiance towards the army. The army is not a body that is impervious to the new winds that are blowing in Latin America.

The army had been trained, in the literal sense of the word, by U.S. imperialism. 2,064 Chilean officers had been trained directly in the U.S., 549 others had been trained in CIA anti-guerrilla schools. The police had received US$5 million. Chile was, let us remember, a country subordinated to foreign capital. This was related to the maintenance and consolidation of large landholdings.

The institutions were protected, and the bourgeoisie – supported by imperialism – would, step by step, build its counter-offensive in the protective shadow of the popular front.

(Before coming to this, it should be pointed out that the popular front always secretes within it a “popular front of struggle”. In Chile, this role was taken by the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a Castroite organization that had carried out guerrilla operations and tried to divert the masses from the electoral field. However, it rallied to the Popular Front overnight. The MIR also provided Allende’s personal security. MIR General Secretary Miguel Enriquez joined the President’s circle of advisers. The MIR, composed of thousands of courageous working-class militants, would never place its action outside the framework of the government coalition. And it would be dragged into disaster with it).

In October 1972, the bourgeoisie tried to carry out a first mobilization of the petty bourgeoisie against the government. The bosses organized acts of provocation and sabotage to stop production. The government remained passive. The reaction of the masses was immediate. The 14,000 Popular Unity Committees had been suspended after the electoral victory of September 4. The workers re-launched them without waiting for instructions from the top.

The masses thus sought to act alongside Allende, to “protect the government” threatened by the forces of reaction. But they did so independently of him, without waiting for him to mobilize them. They did so by taking over bodies like the Price and Supply Committees (JAPs), and by setting up new organizations like the “groups for the protection and defense of the workplace”, which were embryos of the workers’ militias. The “municipal commands” took over the tasks of production, distribution and maintaining order.

In reality, a break was taking place between the working class and the leading circles of the workers’ parties, who were refusing to confront the forces of reaction. At the grassroots, workers of all political persuasions found themselves in the organizations which arose: the cordones industriales (workplace committees). They were formed by delegates elected in the workplaces. Established on a territorial basis, in relation to strikes, factory occupations and mass meetings, the cordones industriales ensured the link between the trade unions, the JAPs and the popular associations of each area.

Faced with the popular mobilization which sometimes took the name of “Chilean October”, the bourgeoisie hastily retreated. But at the end of the month, in the name of a threat of disorder, the law on arms was passed. This law was aimed at prohibiting the arming of workers and authorized the army to enter factories to search for weapons, simply on the basis of an accusation.

The alliance with the bourgeoisie had once again led to defeat

On November 3, 1972, three generals joined Allende’s government: General Prat, Commander-in-chief of the army, became Interior Minister. On the strength of this encouragement to the forces of reaction, a first attempt at a coup d’état took place on June 29, 1973.

For their part, the workers regrouped in the cordones industriales. The latter published their newspapers, through which unifying slogans gradually appeared. They demanded the repeal of the iniquitous law on arms control, the sole purpose of which was to disarm the working class.

They called for the defense of the factories against the abuses by the army. They campaigned on behalf of the constitutionalist sailors who had been tortured by their officers.

In France, the workers followed the developments in the Chilean situation with concern. The vanguard press raised burning questions for the future: “The bourgeoisie and imperialism are organizing sabotage and economic chaos. A truckers’ strike supported by the CIA is disrupting the supply-chain to the cities.[1] Attacks are being organized against railways and high-voltage lines. Imperialism is organizing a covert economic blockade.

Activists are asking: Why doesn’t Popular Unity arm us and call on us to organize militias to guard the bridges, railways and electricity pylons? Why are we being prevented from forming our own brigades to take the place of the defaulting truckers? Why are we being prevented from taking the trucks, from expropriating them to end the strangulation of economic life?

To this, French CP leader Etienne Fajon replied that it was necessary to carry on respecting constitutional legality at all costs. He argued:

What the armed forces call their professional doctrine is based on their cohesion and discipline despite the differences of political opinion of the officers and on their rigorous subordination to the legitimate civilian power.” In a press conference on September 1, 1973 (10 days before the coup), Fajon persisted: “Respect for the Constitution is one of the undeniable characteristics of the behavior of President Allende and his cabinet.”

These words were spoken despite the fact that, since the failed coup of June 29, the armed forces had been systematically striking at the working class. The army had occupied factories under the law authorizing searches for weapons. CUT militants were murdered during these operations.

Actual fighting took place in the factories between the workers and the army. Within the army itself, arrests and murders were organized. Sailors were bound hand-and-foot and thrown into the sea by fascist officers. All this did not prevent Fajon from condemning the activists who were “issuing instructions to the soldiers to disobey orders”, because that would be “playing into the hands of the forces of reaction.

The Chilean CP’s newspaper wrote on August 21, 1973: “The army, in accordance with its best and noblest traditions, will stand guard to ensure national security.”

And it quoted Salvador Allende:

We have trusted, we trust and we will continue to trust the armed forces. The program of Popular Unity establishes that there will be no armed forces other than those provided for by the Constitution and the lawsI have repeated this over and over again.”

The result was tragic.

As soon as the announcement of the coup d’état reached Paris, the French section of the Fourth International (then organized as the Internationalist Communist Organization, OCI) called for solidarity and mobilization in defense of the Chilean people. It convened a rally in Paris. It stressed that the resistance of the workers in the face of the military rampage was heroic. It fought for the effective boycott of the fascist regime.

While unconditionally assuring the indispensable tasks of international workers’ solidarity, it called for an assessment to be made. As a contribution to this reflection, the OCI reproduced the newspaper of the workers of the cordones industriales of Santiago, which was entitled: “Romper con la burguesía” (Break with the bourgeoisie). This was the issue of August 3, 1973, just one month before the coup.

In order for this slogan to be imposed by the masses, a party, an International, was missing. That party is the one we are building.

ENDNOTE

[1] The Truckers’ strike was financed and organized largely by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), an official body of the AFL-CIO trade union federation in the United States. To this date, the AFL-CIO has refused to acknowledge the heinous and shameful role they played in helping to bring down the Allende government. – The Organizer Editorial Board